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Summary. - This paper examines the interaction of socialist ideas and doctrines with Indian 
economic policy-making in the last three decades. It concludes with an analysis of the 
differences between ex-unte aspirations and the ex-post outcomes in regard to these socialist 
objectives. 
Socialist ideas have significantly influenced 
the formulation of the means and objectives of 
Indian economic policies. This has happened in 
two distinct ways: via the impact of external, 
socialist ideologies on the economic and politi- 
cal notions held by Blite groups influencing 
policy-making in India; and via the political 
constraints imposed on the dominant Congress 
Party by the relative strength of the left, and 
the relative weakness of the right, parties in the 
spectrum of Indian politics. Any serious analy- 
sis of the evolution of economic policy in India, 
the particular combination of policy instru- 
ments and objectives characterizing it, and the 
nature of the outcome in terms of the fulfil- 
ment or frustration of the apparent objectives, 
must therefore address itself to the interaction 
of socialist doctrines with it. lt 
1. THE IMPACT OF SOCIALISM ON 
POLICY FRAMEWORK 
Two dominant, socialist influences on 
serious economic thinking during the period of 
the struggle for independence were the example 
of Soviet communism2 and the Fabian Society’s 
deliberations on the nature of the socialist 
society and the gradualist approach thereto,3 
the latter clearly exercising a powerful impact 
through the large numbers of the Indian Elite 
that were processed through the English educa- 
tional institutions prior to Indian independence 
in 1947.4 
Nearly all traditional socialist doctrines lead 
in the direction of public ownership of the 
means of production, and (failing total control 
of the means of production) they equally point 
in the direction of public ownership of the 
‘key’ sectors of production. The specific shape 
given to these doctrines in the Indian context 
however was in the Fabian-type gradualism 
which characterized the transition to public 
ownership, in toto and of the key sectors. Thus, 
nationalizations of existing capital stock were 
de facto ruled out. Rather, the government, 
through successive five-year plans, sought to 
increase the share of the public sector in total 
investment, expecting at the end of such a 
sustained effort to raise the government’s share 
of the capital stock to a dominant level: the 
approach to the Marxist goal of public owner- 
ship was thus to be asymptotic.5 Similarly, on 
the problem of key sectors, the ‘commanding 
heights’ of the economy, defined to include 
steel and heavy industry, the successive ln- 
dustrial Policy Resolutions of the government 
again focused on reservation of these areas to 
public sector investment rather than on the 
take-over of existing private sector concerns (as 
in the case of the Tata Steel).6 
While, therefore, the impact of Fabian 
gradualism, as also the pragmatic sense that the 
private sector be allowed to make a contribu- 
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tion to industrialization in the medium-run economic externality in terms of added savings 
while the economy was being transformed into formation. Tax policy was likely to be con- 
one dominated by the public sector, was strained by political factors and the-public 
evident in the policies just detailed, the impact sector concerns could more readily raise the 
of the Soviet example was to be manifest in ‘revenue’ and savings to lead to greater capital 
three other areas of economic policy which formation through suitable price policy. Again, 
were to set the stage equally significantly for 
India’s economic performance.7 First, the pos- 
the industrial and import licensing machinery 
was not merely directed at the regulation of the 
sibility of a shift to heavy industry, within the composition of industrial production and in- 
industrialization programme, was to charac- vestment, but was also considered necessary as 
terize the Second Five-year Plan (1956-61), an instrument for preventing the concentration 
and was to continue into the Third Plan until of wealth and economic power within a limited 
the shift into the Green Revolution strategy 
began towards the end of the Third Plan.8 
number of large Industrial Houses in the private 
sector. 
Next, the industrialization programme was to Socialist thinking and precept influenced not 
become subject to targeting for many industries merely the policy-making elite in the Congress 
and to detailed industrial licensing, extending Party that has virtually dominated the political 
to product-level attention and regulation, over scene since independence in 1947; it also 
the entire, modern, large-scale non-agricultural constrained the flexibility of the Congress Party 
sector-the key role in elevating this approach for moving in other directions, because the 
to a sacrosanct principle being played by the more doctrinaire left-wing political parties 
Industrial Regulation Act of 1961.9 Finally, pulled the Congress Party’s programmes in the 
the notion that an overview of the economy be socialist direction, at least at the ex-ante level 
taken, and the main thrust of the economy be of party resolutions and declared intentions. 
defined and given shape therein, led along the Indeed, within the Congress Party itself, the left 
Soviet lines to the Five-year Plan formulation: wing has exerted strong pressure in the direc- 
though, here again, the First Plan was a rather tion of socialist programmes, and the party split 
loosely-defined exercise adding up largely to into the Old and the New Congress, along these 
social-overhead projects and broad fiscal lines, with the New Congress of Mrs. Indira 
policy objectives, much along the lines of the Gandhi castigating the Old, and now increas- 
Harrod-Domar, flow-model framework, and it ingly defunct, Congress as right-wing and reac- 
was only with the Second Plan that the rather tionary. In fact, the political ethos of the 
tighter, consistency approach, closer to the country has made ‘socialism’ a good word that 
Soviet-type planning framework, was adopted wins elections, unlike in the United States 
and investment allocations were more speci- where, as Galbraith discovered in the last 
fically set 0ut.l O national election, it is a word that loses 
It might be noted that these major contours elections. Whether, however, the socialist con- 
of the Indian economic policy framework, tent of the programmes has been real or 
influenced by socialist thinking of the Fabian illusory, and whether the programmes when 
type and by the Soviet practice of socialism, socialist have been successful or compromised, 
were reinforced by other factors on the scene is a separate issue, undoubtedly of importance, 
and, indeed, in many instances reinforced one which we defer till later in this paper. 
another. Thus, the Second Plan was to precipi- 
tate a foreign exchange crisis in 1956-7, which 
led to the view that foreign exchange should be II. RELATED DIMENSIONS OF 
preserved carefully by administrative regula- POLICY FRAMEWORK 
tion; this, in turn, strengthened the impulse to 
license and to target capacity creation and Finally, it is necessary to complete the 
output along Soviet lines. Similarly, the ex- picture of the economic policy framework in 
panded role of heavy industry with the Second 
Plan reinforced the relative expansion of the 
India, as she entered the planning period in 
1949-50 and through the decade of the 1950s 
public sector share of investment; it was diffi- 
cult to persuade the private sector to invest in 
and much of the 196Os, by sketching in some 
additional dimensions. 
heavy industry and the public sector had to Raising minimum incomes through growth. 
step in, quite aside from ideological reasons, to 
undertake these investments. To take yet 
It is clear that, from an early stage, Indian 
policy thinking was dominated by the view that 
another example, the expansion of the public the distribution of income could not be signifi- 
sector was also seen by many as yielding an cantly affected by distributive measures of a 
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fiscal type. Partly this view reflected the feel- 
ing, based on earlier statistical studies, that, 
short of communist societies, the Lorenz-curve 
type of distribution measures indicated that 
very little could be changed by way of the 
distribution of income in different societies. 
More importantly, this view was reinforced by 
the view that a long-lasting effect on the 
incomes of the poor was possible only if the 
economy was geared to raising incomes, invest- 
ment and hence jobs for the underemployed as 
rapidly as possible: the alternative policy of 
using savings to redistribute consumption 
immediately, as distinct from investing them, 
was considered a short-term, myopic policy for 
a country with the staggering problem of 
poverty that India had, and was to be used only 
moderately to provide public consumption, as 
discussed below. 
Thus Indian economic policy was essentially 
set up in the context of a growth model aimed 
at achieving a rapid rate of growth, reaching 
increasing levels of domestic saving through 
appropriate tax effort (as evidenced by the 
growth of taxes as a percentage of GNP and by 
the share, at over a quarter during the 196Os, of 
the public sector in domestic savings forma- 
tion), and supplementing them during the 
transition with foreign resources to reach 
required investment 1evels.l 1 It was optimisti- 
cally hoped that the economy would then grow 
to reach self-sustained growth within a perspec- 
tive of up to 25 years, and that a serious dent 
would have been made in the problem of 
ameliorating poverty on a sustained basis. 
External capital. The policy assumption 
thus, at least by the Second Plan, was that the 
country would utilize foreign assistance,l 2 
using ‘aid to end aid’. And, indeed, the utiliza- 
tion of external assistance from all sources, 
Western and Soviet-bloc, was to run at signifi- 
cant levels from 1956-7 down to the mid- 
196Os, even though, on a per capita or share-of- 
GNP basis, India was among the least-favoured 
recipients of aid by virtue of its size.13 As 
regards private foreign investment, attitudes 
were coloured by the Indian colonial ex- 
perience: such investment was regulated 
closely, directed to specific areas, and left-wing 
opinion was always critical of it, even though, 
given India’s size, there was no reason to fear 
that such investment could ever have arrived at 
levels which would threaten the country with 
the unenviable status of a banana republic. 
Expansion of public consumption. Another 
dimension of the economic programmes, defin- 
ing the distributional content of the Plans, was 
provided by educational and health expendi- 
tures. These were intended to supplement the 
growth of private consumption as the growth 
mechanism led to more jobs and more incomes 
for the poor. While, however, these expendi- 
tures were built into all Plans, they were not to 
be the intended focus of a poverty-elimination 
strategy until the early 1970s.14 
Land reform. Perhaps the most-discussed, 
but the least successful, programmes related to 
land reform. In a country shot through with a 
large variety of land tenure systems, there were 
several dimensions on which land reform could 
be sought, both on distributional and on 
efficiency grounds. Absentee landlordism 
(under the notorious Zamindari system) was 
made illegal in the north, while security of 
landholding for the tenant was legislated for in 
other areas (such as in Gujerat and Maharash- 
tra) with notable success. But efforts at impos- 
ing land ceilings and at promoting co-operative 
farming, two further components of land re- 
form policy in India, were to fail to take root, 
as we shall discuss presently. 
The resulting Indian policy. framework 
through the 1950s and most of the 1960s can 
then be characterized, from the standpoint of 
socialist precept and notions, as having the 
following dimensions: 
(i) an increasing share of public investments, 
at over half the share in the total at the outset 
of the planning process; 
(ii) an increasing public share in the capital 
stock of ‘key’ industrial sectors such as heavy 
industry, resulting from a fairly strict (though 
not total, in practice) reservation of such 
sectors for public sector investment; 
(iii) a definite denial of nationalization of 
existing capital stock as the means to increasing 
public ownership; 
(iv) the use of substantial targeting, and of 
far more comprehensive industrial (and import) 
licensing, to control and direct the level and 
composition of industrial production and in- 
vestment at product-level detail; 
(v) the related attempt at using licensing to 
prevent the concentration of industrial wealth 
and power within a small number of families 
and groups; 
(vi) a development strategy aimed at raising 
investments and jobs as rapidly as domestic 
fiscal effort and external assistance would 
permit, with only moderate use of resources to 
provide public consumption (health and educa- 
tion, in the main) by way of direct redistribu- 
tion for ameliorating poverty in the short run; 
(vii) an investment-composition strategy 
which implied both industrialization and, with- 
in it, a substantial Soviet-style expansion of 
heavy industry-turning on its head the tradi- by many Western commentators of liberal 
tional, Western economic notions that heavy persuasion as making the Indian programme an 
industry should come in the later, rather than important and desirable enough rival to the 
the earlier, process of industrialization; and Chinese communist model. This favourable 
(viii) an agricultural strategy, whose major perception was to change during the mid-l 960s 
components were modest land reforms aimed as the socialist elements in the Indian policy 
eventually at (a) security of tenancy, (b) framework came increasingly to be contrasted 
abolition of absentee landlordism, (c) land rather with the ideologically-more-attractive 
ceilings to reduce concentration of land owner- developmental strategies of less neutral coun- 
ship and (d) co-operative farming and market- tries such as Pakistan and quasi-satellites uch as 
ing, plus land extension, irrigation and commu- South Korea. Moreover, it was to change also 
nity development programmes-excluding during the early 197Os, but from the opposite 
therefore any radical nationalization of land for perspective as detente with China made Sino- 
state farming or redistribution to the landless logy respectable on the mainland United States 
labourers. and as the widespread, uncritical condemnation 
It is perhaps useful also, in the spirit of by armchair Sinologists of the Chinese develop- 
Indian philosophy, to characterize the socialist mental model was replaced by enthusiastic 
dimensions of the Indian policy framework by approbation by jet-setting Sinologists now 
what they were not. State ownership did not permitted to peek at the great Chinese experi- 
imply workers’ control over management or ment. 
even their significant participation therein: the While, therefore, the Indian policy frame- 
Yugoslav form of socialism was not an inspira- work had been oversold earlier, and was later to 
tion for Indian socialists on any significant be undersold, largely as a reflection of Western 
scale. Nor were the socialist arguments of the ideological concerns and intellectual fashions, 
Lange-Lemer variety, which so greatly domi- there is little doubt that its performance during 
nated the economic debate among the oppo- the last two decades has also raised serious 
nents of socialism and the proponents of doubts about its efficacy and desirability. 
socialism such as Durbin, of any real import to In particular, India’s rates of accumulation 
Indian policy-makers or intellectuals. The and growth since the mid-1960s have been 
Feldman-Mahalonobis-type structuralist argu- disappointing, in relation to her past perform- 
ments on the rational composition of invest- ance, her plans, as also to the performance of 
ment that culminated in optimal-growth theory many LDCs of diverse sizes and ideological 
were far more influential than the rational- persuasions. At the same time, an increasing 
price-policy implications of the Lange-Lerner number of studies of income distribution in the 
variety. country suggest strongly that the bottom 
The resulting policy framework was clearly deciles have not improved their consumption 
of a mixed-economy type, with the modern and levels since planning be an 
f 
and may, in fact, 
growing non-agricultural sectors subject to have become worse off. 5 The framework of 
growing public investments and to extensive Indian economic policies has therefore been 
licensing and control of private investments and called into question on several dimensions, 
production, while the agricultural sector-still from the viewpoints of both the capitalist 
contributing half of the net domestic product- objective of efficiency and the socialist objec- 
was subject only to comparatively modest tive of equity. However, we will focus our 
attempts at control and/or radical transforma- analysis here on the socialist aspects of India’s 
tion of the prevalent land tenure systems. This performance. 
policy framework was considered by most 1. As the Indian economy has evolved, it 
observers at the time to be socialist in its main has become fairly evident that the above- 
thrust: and indeed it was influenced signifi- described mix of policies, addressed to the 
cantly, in its conception, by socialist precepts public and private sectors, has produced essen- 
and example, as we have already noted. tially a renfier, rather than a socialist (or 
capitalist) society. 
2. The extent of controls over private pro- 
III. EX-ANTE ASPIRATIONS AND duction and Investment in the modern, large- 
EX-POST PERFORMANCE scale industrial sector, has long exceeded that 
justified by any economic rationale. It has to be 
In fact, the combination of an Anglo-Saxon seen rather as a pseudo-socialist policy which, 
democratic framework and the socialist orienta- in fact, creates sheltered markets for entre- 
tion of India’s economic programmes was taken preneurs who earn rents on their licences and, 
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in the ultimate political analysis, share them 
increasingly with the party in power. In fact, 
the licensing machinery, for distributing im- 
ports and scarce materials, has not even suc- 
ceeded in checking the growth of concentrated 
economic power by the large Industrial Houses. 
At the same time, it has become evident that 
the price and distributional controls are 
generally used to buttress non-proletarian in- 
terests. For example, of the small number of 
produced and price-controlled cars, a specific 
quota goes to government officials who thereby 
are assigned the high premia that the new cars 
fetch in the market. The licensing mechanism 
produces, at best, redistribution essentially out- 
side of the poverty sector-from the rich to the 
not-so-rich-and generates considerable econo- 
mic inefficiency which, in reducing the produc- 
tivity of investment, compromises the strategy 
of rapid growth to provide increasing jobs to 
the po0r.l 6 
3. The expansion of the public sector, in 
turn, has raised serious questions. The objective 
of expanding the public sector has indeed been 
adhered to, more or less; indeed, as we shall 
presently discuss, even nationalizations have 
been increasingly undertaken, contrary to the 
early declarations of policy. But the public 
sector has not generated the expected surpluses 
for investment and growth. And their manage- 
ment has suffered from the constraints imposed 
by their bureaucratic structure and the absence 
of any ultimate penalty for inefficiency-much 
as the private sector’s efficiency has been 
impaired, though not to the same degree (given 
the profit motive), by the creation of sheltered 
markets through the comprehensive licensing 
system. The Indian system of parliamentary 
control has also had the effect of constraining 
further the exercise of initiative, and the 
consequent ability to survive short-term mis- 
takes in the pursuit of long-term efficiency, on 
the part of the management which, in any case, 
was likely to be risk-averting owing to its 
heavily-bureaucratic origins.17 
4. While therefore the policies in the non- 
agricultural, modern sector have deployed 
socialist-type instruments (e.g., strict licensing 
of the private, and expansion of the public, 
sectors), the net outcome has been rather to 
create a rentier society, with its attendant 
economic inefficiencies, and a political use of 
these instruments generally to redistribute in- 
comes within groups distinctly above the 
poverty line and, only fractionally, to groups 
below that line. 
5. The corresponding lag in pushing land 
reforms has also been quite notable. It appears 
that, in the agricultural sector, the land reform 
legislation has not managed to affect signifi- 
cantly the concentration of land ownership.18 
The benefits of the Green Revolution again 
seem to have accrued mainly to the larger 
farmers, with the cheap fertilizers and credit 
going principally to them rather than to the 
smaller farmers, and with the landless labour 
finding its real wages inadequately responsive to 
the increased productivity of agriculture. 1 g 
Accumulating evidence, and growing percep- 
tion, regarding these sharp contrasts between 
ex-un te aspirations and ex-post realities have 
naturally raised serious questions among Indian 
intellectuals about the relationship of the class 
structure in India to the composition of its 
political elite and formulation of Indian econo- 
mic policy, thus raising to the forefront of even 
neoclassical policy analysis the traditionally 
neo-Marxist concerns. 
The witticism that India’s socialist pattern 
was little more than socialist patter now elicits 
more than mirth; it is the starting point for 
serious and systematic reflection on the direc- 
tions that Indian economic policy and per- 
formance can be expected to take. The Indian 
economist, Raj Krishna, has aptly described the 
central tendency of Indian policy as ‘first- 
round’ socialism: ostensibly socialist measures 
which wind up being aborted or subverted in 
execution. 
Few intellectuals in India now believe that 
under the existing political set-up, with a ruling 
Congress Party still heavily dominated by the 
urban middle class, large-scale entrepreneurs 
and landed interests, there can be any real 
moves from a socialist platform to a socialist 
reality. This is not a political party with a clear 
ideological commitment like Lenin’s Bolsheviks 
or Mao’s communists; and its professed com- 
mitment to socialist notions is increasingly seen 
to be one of political convenience rather than 
convictions. 
Thus, the recent nationalizations, especially 
of banking in 1969, were timed so as to assist 
the (New) Congress Party in consolidating its 
political position, rather than out of socialist 
convictions, the increased trend towards such 
‘conspicuous’ acts of socialism being designed 
essentially to deflect attention from the lack of 
genuine progress in distributional and growth 
objectives in the economy. Paradoxically, there- 
fore, the cosmetics of socialism have been 
increasingly used, unlike in the Nehru era 
(when pragmatism largely reflected economic 
necessity rather than political expediency), as 
the economic programmes are increasingly seen 
to lack any real, socialist content. 
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Perhaps such an outcome, from a socialist 
viewpoint, was inevitable. Unlike the Marxist- 
communist tradition, which imparts a strong 
ideological basis for revolutionary struggle and 
fairly clear objectives to which such a struggle 
can be addressed, the English socialist tradition 
(which most Indian intellectuals, including 
Nehru, inherited) is strictly empirical and non- 
ideological.20 Such a tradition surely ran the 
risk, both of degenerating, over time, into 
socialist patter, without a concrete programme 
being executed by an ideologically-inspired 
cadre of socialists, and, indeed, of being cap- 
tured and turned into an instrument of 
bourgeois classes pursuing their own interests 
behind a socialist screen. 
In fact, one might cynically predict that, if 
the economic difficulties of the present govern- 
ment intensify-as they well might, with the 
government committed to the rentier frame- 
work in the modern, non-agricultural sector for 
political expediency and with the agricultural 
expansion thanks to the Green Revolution in 
jeopardy largely (though not exclusively) due 
to the exogenous shock of the oil crisis-there 
could follow a series of acts of apparent 
socialism to maintain the image of progressivity 
in the spectrum of ideas on the Indian scene. 
And, qun policy economists, one might well 
argue then, cynically indeed, that the best thing 
for economists, in this type of set-up, would be 
to work out a number of such conspicuous acts 
of socialism which can be pulled out, periodi- 
cally, to enable the government to maintain its 
socialist image, but making sure that they are 
not economically expensive!*l The policy of 
bank nationalization in 1969 was precisely such 
a no-loss type of socialist measure which won 
the Congress Party some more years in office; 
but the nationalization of wholesale wheat 
trade in 1973 was an economic disaster and, to 
its credit, the government decisively back- 
tracked from this decision.** Whether the 
advisers to the present regime will be able to 
walk this tightrope of bourgeois policies in a 
socialist framework for much longer, and with 
minimal damage to the economy, is a question 
to which there are no obvious answers. 
NOTES 
1. It should be emphasized that, in turn, the course 
of economic policy and performance in India has also 
influenced socialist thinking among the intellectuals. 
2. Among the dominant nationaiist leaders who 
articulated extensively on the possibility of adopting a 
Soviet-type system in India, were Mahatma Gandhi, 
Nehru and Tagore. It would seem that, in their 
evaluation of Marxism-Leninism-Communism, all 
three categorically rejected the violent means of 
achieving a socialist system while, in essence, agreeing 
with its basic objectives. 
Thus Gandhi wrote: ‘I believe in non-violent . . . 
commumsm..  . if communism came without any 
violence, it would be welcome. For then no property 
would be held by anybody except on behalf of the 
people and for the people.’ [Hurz~un, 13 February 
1937, p. 45.1 Again: ‘What does communism mean in 
the last analysis? It means a classless ociety, an ideal 
that is worth striving for. Only I part company with it 
when force is called to aid for achieving it.’ [HIV&~, 
13 March 1937, p. 152.1 However, his reaction to the 
Bolshevik revolution and Soviet achievements was 
totally negative. Thus: ‘India does not want Bolshe 
vism.’ [Young India, 1 May 1920, p. 18; Young India, 
24 November 1921, p. 510.1 Then again: ‘As I look to 
Russia, where the apotheosis of industrialization has 
been reached, the life there does not appeal to me. . . . 
In modem terms, it is beneath human dignity to lose 
one’s individuality and become a mere cog in the 
machine. I want every individual to become a full- 
blooded, full-developed member of the society.’ 
[Harijan, 28 January 1939, p. 438.1 It is not 
surprising that Soviet commentators under Stalin 
referred to him as a ‘Hindu reactionary’. 
As for Nehru, his reaction to the Russian revolu- 
tion, after his visit to the Soviet Union in 1927, was 
euphoric: ‘. . . if the future is full of hope, it is largely 
because of Soviet Russia and what it has done. . . .’ 
[ Jawaharlal Nehru, Important Speeches, Being a Col- 
lection of Most Significant Speeches Delivered by 
Jawahorlal Nehru from 1922 to 1946, edited by J. S. 
Bright (Lahore, 1946) p. 94.1 Later on, there was a 
slight modification in his euphoria in view of the purge 
trials. While he believed the trials to be ‘bona fide’ to 
the extent that there was a ‘definite conspiracy’ 
against the Soviet government, he nonetheless admit- 
ted that the trials indicated ‘ill health’ in the Soviet 
body politic if it required the employment of such 
‘violence’ as a remedy. [For details, see JawaharIaI <, 
N&u, From Lucknow to Trlpura: A Survey of 
Congress Politics, p. 116.1 
As for the actual adoption of a Soviet-type system 
in India, Nehru’s attitude was negative both from the 
point of view of the method of implementing it and, 
also, its timing. Thus on the former issue, he wrote: 
‘In regard to the method and approach to this ideal, I 
may not agree with everything that the orthodox 
Communists have done. I think that these methods 
will have to adapt themselves to changing conditions 
and may vary in different countries.. . .’ [As quoted 
in Sub&as C, B_ose, The Indian Struggle, 1920-34 
(London: Wishart & Co., 1934) p. 346.1 On the issue 
of timing, he was more explicit: ‘Much as I wish for 
the advancement o socialism in this country, I have 
no desire to force the issue in the Congress and 
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thereby create difficulties in the way of our struggle 
for independence.’ [Jawaharlal Nehru, Towards fief?- 
dom, Appendix, p. 402.1 Also: ‘. . . the Congress 
stands today for full democracy in India and fights for 
a democratic state, not for socialism.’ [ibid.] 
3. In particular, Jawaharlal Nehru, who shaped 
India’s socialist policy after independence, was greatly 
influenced by Fabian ideas which, in turn, were rooted 
in the traditions of English utilitarianism, empiricism 
and classical economic thought. English socialist tradi- 
tion, in fact, was reformist from the beginning, in 
contrast to French socialism which was revolutionary. 
‘The decisive difference lay in the fact that the French 
Revolution had taught man to think in terms of 
seizing power.’ [Cf. George Lichtheim, The Origins of 
Socialism (Frederick Praeger, 1969) p. 18.1 The 
political counterpart of Fabian reformism was the 
adoption of a parliamentary, constitutional democracy 
for purposes of socialist legislation: indeed, as Nehru 
was to conceive of the appropriate political framework 
for India’s transition to socialism. 
It may however be noted that the reformist, 
gradualist political process was reinforced on the 
Indian scene also by the general rejection (already 
noted) of violence as a method of political action: this 
Gandhian preference for peaceful action, in turn, 
being rooted in Indian religious humanism. 
4. The impact of English economic thinking on the 
Indian elite’s attitude to governmental planning should 
not also be underestimated. At Cambridge (where 
most of the leading Indian economists were trained 
until studying in the United States became a viable 
option), the emphasis was typically on the inadequacy 
of the Invisible Hand, with little attention to how the 
Visible Hand system of intervention would operate in 
practice. Contrast this with the training of the Chicago 
economist where the failures of actual intervention are 
continually focused on and, in certain versions of the 
doctrine, even Benthamite intervention to preserve 
laissez-fare is considered unnecessary and/or counter- 
productive. 
5. Thus, in the Second Fiveyear Plan, the share of 
the public sector in total investment was estimated at 
54.0 per cent and it was planned at 58.6 per cent and 
63.7 per cent in the Third and Fourth Plans respeo 
tively. 
6. The resulting composition of public sector invest- 
ment was heavily weighted towards steel, engineering, 
petroleum, chemicals, and mining and minerals, in that 
order. 
7. We use the phrase ‘Soviet example’ quite deli- 
berately. There is, in fact, little evidence that Soviet 
writings or Soviet political pressure had any significant 
impact on the thinking of Indian intellectuals or 
political parties or, more directly, on policy formula 
tion. For a well-argued piece on this point, see 
Stephen Clarkson, ‘The low impact of Soviet writing 
and aid on Indian thinking and policy’, Survey (1973) 
pp. l-23. 
8. We may speculate that the shift to heavy industry 
was reinforced tangentially by Fabian influence as 
welL The Fabians had a rationalist faith in industry 
and science; and Nehru was to share it. His concern 
with modern technology and science was manifest in 
areas such as atomic energy and his acceptance of 
modern, heavy industry as part of India’s economic 
programmes must therefore have been perfectly 
natural. 
9. Details of this Act, and of the policy of industrial 
licensing as also target-setting, can be found in J. 
Bhagwati and Padma Desai, India: Planning for Indus- 
trialization (London: Oxford University Press, 1970) 
especially chs. 12-14. 
10. Of these three types of impact of the Soviet 
example, the Plan-formulation approach was to be 
enthusiastically received by most commentators and, 
indeed, to lead to demands on the part of aid agencies 
for similar efforts by other developing countries. 
However, the shift to heavy industry was seen as a 
definite mistake by economic opinion of the Chicago 
school variety, reflecting their basic unfamiliarity with 
the structural models of growth and development 
planning of the Feldman-Mahalanobis variety-an 
ignorance which probably still persists. The detailed 
regulation was not quite noticed at the time, except 
by conservative commentators whose position how- 
ever was extreme and precluded governmental plan- 
ning of industrial investments on any scale. 
11. In fact, this is really how foreign aid advocates 
and agencies often estimated aid requirements. Cf. J. 
Bhagwati, Amount and Sharing of Aid (Washington, 
D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1971) chapter 
V. For details on Indian planning models, as they 
evolved through the Plans, consult J. Bhagwati andS. 
Chakravarti, Contributions to Indian Economic Anoly- 
sis, Supplement to American Economic Review 
(September 1970). 
12. The decision to utilize foreign aid reflected, not 
merely the need to supplement domestic savings 
effort, but also a number of external factors favour- 
able to the supply of aid to India. Thus, during the 
late 195Os, the aid climate was generally favourable, 
faith in India’s development effort was running high 
and, against the background of the Cold War, Nehru’s 
policy of non-alignment was effective in extracting aid 
from both the Western and Soviet-bloc donors. 
13. As a proportion of NNP at factor cost, the 
utilization of external assistance by India was 2.37 in 
1957-8, 3.01 in 1960-1, 3.35 in 1963-4, 3.55 in 
1964-5, 3.67 in 1965-6, and then fell substantially 
to 0.69,0.71, 0.52 and 0.48 in the next four years. 
14. Commenting rather favourably on this aspect of 
Indian planning, William Lockwood writes: ‘. . . Yet it 
is of great human significance that India, for example, 
has doubled her food supplies since independence and 
left behind the great famines of history, that she has 
tripled the number of children in school until they 
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now approach 100 million, that she has improved 
health care to the point where life expectancy at birth 
has risen from 35 to 52, that her factories now provide 
her people with two million bicycles a year, that her 
newspaper press, one of the liveliest in the world, now 
reaches regularly some 20 million readers. . .’ For 
details, see William W. Lockwood, ‘Asian triangle: 
China, India, Japan’, Foreign Affairs. 
By contrast, K. N. Raj assesses the failures of this 
aspect of Indian planning in terms of the extent to 
which the public distribution system (in essential 
items such as food-grains) has reached the masses of 
the people. Thus at the end of December 1972, the 
population covered by statutory rationing was only 16 
million, mainly in the urban and semi-urban areas. 
Looking at the problem slightly differently, it would 
seem that whereas at least 20 per cent of the total 
consumption of food-grains in the country should be 
distributed statutorily to low-income groups, this 
magnitude was in the range of 12 to 13 per cent in the 
acute droueht Years of 1966 and 1967. For details, see 
his ‘Planning and prices in India’, Centre for Develop- 
ment Studies, Trivandrum, March 1974, especially 
part II. 
15. The evidence has been reviewed well by Pranab 
Bardhan in ‘Redistribution with growth.: some country 
experience: India’, in H. Chenery, M. AhluwaBa, 
C. L. G. Bell, J. Duloy, and R. Jolly, Redistribution 
with Growth (Oxford University Press, 1974). How- 
ever, the evidence is not conclusive in our judgement, 
and also excludes public consumption. 
16. The detailed evidence in support of this conclu- 
sion has been discussed at great length in~Bhagwati and 
Desai, op. cit., and has been further analysed in J. 
Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan, Foreign Trade Regimes 
and Economic Development: India, NBER (Columbia 
University Press, 1975, forthcoming). The political 
and social framework of the policies in this and the 
next paragraph have been discussed by G. Rosen, 
Democracy and Economic Change in India (University 
of California Press, 1966). 
17. Nor have the Indian public sector enterprises been 
proof from pressures to use them for political pur- 
poses, e.g., to take on unsuitable or unnecessary staff; 
but there seems to be no evidence that this has been 
done on a systematic and crippling scale, as in 
Menderes’ Turkey, for example, or significantly more 
than in the private sector in a society traditionally 
working on kinship and patronage principles. 
18. Thus K. N. Raj, in ‘What does socialism imply for 
economic policy in India now?‘, Mainstream (25 
January 1964) has argued that: ‘In the rural sector, 
land legislation since Independence has not made 
much difference to concentration in land ownership in 
the rural areas, and has in the main only induced the 
larger holders of land to either disguise the true 
position (by partitioning land among members of the 
same family, reporting tenants as attached labourers, 
etc.) or, in some cases, to take a more active interest in 
the cultivation of land in order to prevent the accrual 
of occupancy rights to others. The available data (such 
as those provided by the Planning Commission and the 
National Sample Survey) do not bring out adequately 
the extent of concentration in land ownership (both 
on account of the definitions of ownership adopted 
and the various methods of concealment open to 
owners at the stage of reporting). They also overstate 
the share of the larger units in “operated” (as 
distinguished from “owned”) holdings, since the 
owners have an interest in reporting themselves as 
actual cultivators even when they depend really on 
sharecroppers for the cultivation of their land. In 
reality, therefore, ownership is much more concentra- 
ted, and cultivation takes place in much smaller units, 
than we are led to believe by these statistics. The slow 
progress of consolidation of plots (except in a few 
states) makes the actual cultivation units even more 
fragmented than would otherwise be the case.’ 
19. However, there is some evidence to the contrary. 
Thus there is evidence that average real farm wages in 
the Punjab in 1967-9 were significantly above the 
pre-1966 average. Also, in Kerala and Madras, the two 
rice-growing states with the highest relative food-grain 
acreages of 17 and 14 per cent devoted respectively to 
the new varieties of rice, real wages of farm labour in 
1967-9 have risen significantly over the 1954-66 
average in comparison to other rice-growing states, 
where real farm wages declined. For details, see R. W. 
Herdt and E. A. Baker, ‘Agricultural wages, produc- 
tion and high-yielding varieties’, Economic and Politi- 
cal Weekly, Bombay, Vol. VII, No. 13, (25 March 
1972). Also, it seems as if the disproportionate share 
of the larger farmers in cheap credit and fertilizers 
may reflect partly their greater ability to innovate 
with risk rather than their political power in the 
regime. 
20. The English socialist tradition has been empirical- 
rationalist. Lichtheim notes that ‘The British aban- 
doned philosophical speculation in favour of an 
approach rooted in their non-traditional empiricism: 
the utilitarian doctrine, with its stress upon practical 
consequences and the “greatest happiness” of the 
greatest number.’ [op.cit., p.12.1 
By contrast, Marx rejected the utilitarian generali- 
zation that reasonable behaviour by individuals results 
in beneficial outcome for the community. In his 
judgement, the aggregate does not necessarily equal 
the sum of its elements and what is good for the 
individual could be determined only on the basis of an 
inquiry into the ultimate truth about history and 
society as well as man and nature. The inquiry which 
he undertook was a grand synthesis of philosophy, 
history and economics. In this fusion, historical reality 
proceeds from one stage to another in a dynamic but 
deterministic fashion as a result of continuous inter- 
action between the material base of production and 
the ideological superstructure relevant to each stage. 
The ultimate and desirable stage is a classless ociety 
via a proletarian revolution. In their attempts at 
achieving this goal, Lenin and Mao further altered and 
refined the Marxist framework with endless discus- 
sions of what constitutes an objective revolutionary 
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reality and who can be the agents of revolutions, of 
the distinction between ‘spontaneity’ and ‘conscious- 
ness’ and tactic and strategy, of the absolute pre- 
requisite of classifying groups in terms of their class 
allegiance and so on. 
All this, of course, was a far cry from the English 
socialist tradition which Nehru practised on the Indian 
scene. 
21. This type of political economy could make a far 
greater contribution to the economic growth of a 
country in India’s political predicament than any 
other single piece of economic research! 
22. This ability to reverse ill-considered decisions is 
still one of the major assets of the present Indian 
regime. Albert Hirschman has argued that the failure 
to perceive progress may be the chief obstacle to 
progress. One can improve on this witticism and say 
rather that the failure to perceive failure may be the 
chief obstacle to progress. 
